Analyzing Revenue Sharing and Buyback Contracts: An Experimental Study by Ramaswamy, Chinthana
University of Massachusetts Boston
ScholarWorks at UMass Boston
Graduate Masters Theses Doctoral Dissertations and Masters Theses
12-1-2012
Analyzing Revenue Sharing and Buyback
Contracts: An Experimental Study
Chinthana Ramaswamy
University of Massachusetts Boston
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.umb.edu/masters_theses
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons
This Open Access Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Doctoral Dissertations and Masters Theses at ScholarWorks at UMass
Boston. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. For more
information, please contact library.uasc@umb.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ramaswamy, Chinthana, "Analyzing Revenue Sharing and Buyback Contracts: An Experimental Study" (2012). Graduate Masters
Theses. Paper 142.
 
 
ANALYZING REVENUE SHARING AND BUYBACK CONTRACTS:  
AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 
 
 
 
A Thesis Presented 
by 
CHINTHANA RAMASWAMY 
 
 
Submitted to the office of Graduate Studies, 
University of Massachusetts Boston, 
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 
 
 
 
 
 
December 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
Business Administration and Management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2012 by Chinthana Ramaswamy 
All rights reserved 
 
 
ANALYZING REVENUE SHARING AND BUYBACK CONTRACTS:   
AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 
 
A Thesis Presented 
by 
CHINTHANA RAMASWAMY 
 
 
Approved as to style and content by:  
 
 
 
________________________________________________  
Ehsan Elahi, Assistant Professor  
Chairperson of the Committee  
 
 
 
________________________________________________  
Davood Golmohammadi, Assistant Professor  
Member  
 
 
 
_________________________________________  
Atreya Chakraborty, Associate Professor  
Member  
 
 
 
________________________________________________  
                                     Philip L. Quaglieri, Dean  
                                     College of Management  
 
 
 
________________________________________________  
                                                 Pratyush Bharati, Chairman  
                              Management Information Systems Department 
v 
 
ABSTRACT 
ANALYZING REVENUE SHARING AND BUYBACK CONTRACTS:  
AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 
 
 
December 2012 
Chinthana Ramaswamy, B.E., Vishweshwaraiah Technological University (India) 
M.B.A., University of Massachusetts Boston 
Directed by Dr. Ehsan Elahi 
 
 This paper considers a standard newsvendor problem in a two-echelon supply 
chain setup. We use an experimental approach to investigate the deviation of decision 
makers from choosing optimal values in the context of supply chain contracts. Literature 
suggests that the coordinating contracts, such as revenue sharing or buyback contracts, do 
not necessarily improve the performance. Approaches to improve the existing revenue 
sharing and buyback contracts are examined in this paper. A rational supplier, who is 
likely to commit decision errors, sets the contract parameters to a retailer. These 
approaches are observed in a laboratory setting where human subjects are used to verify 
the experimental studies. The results show that the revenue sharing contracts, with 
appropriate feedback, can reduce the demand-chasing characteristic, generally seen in 
decision makers. This paper also discusses limitations and provides suggestions to future 
research. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Problem 
Decision making plays a significant role in businesses that faces stochastic or 
uncertain demand. One such decision-making problem frequently observed is the 
newsvendor problem. Here, the newsvendor or the decision maker has to place an order 
quantity, which maximizes profit. However, the newsvendor has to place this order 
before the selling season and also faces uncertain demand. If the ordered quantity is less 
than the demand, then the newsvendor loses opportunity to sell. On contrary, if the 
ordered quantity is more than the demand, then the newsvendor will have unsold 
inventory. Since the demand is uncertain, the newsvendor will incur loss in all scenarios.  
A large stream of research in this field considers a two-echelon supply chain, 
where the supplier sells the products to retailer, who in turn sells the product to end 
customers. In such a setup, the supplier and the retailer selling the products make profits 
individually. This results in high retail price and low overall profits for the channel, 
causing double marginalization. Also due to high wholesale price, the retailer tries to 
reduce the risk of unsold items and orders a lower quantity, thereby reducing the 
channel’s profit. In order to avoid such issues, past studies by Cachon (2003) suggest that 
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with appropriate contracts, a better coordination can be seen between a retailer and a 
supplier. 
To improve the coordination between the supplier and retailer, the supplier can 
offer a contract that provides the retailer with adequate economic incentives to order the 
quantity that maximizes the channel profit (a coordinating contract). In this thesis, two 
types of coordinating contracts, revenue sharing and buyback, are considered. In a 
revenue sharing contract, the supplier offers a relatively low wholesale price however, the 
retailer has to share part of the revenue for every item sold. In a buyback contract, the 
supplier buys back any unsold item from the retailer with a price lower than the 
wholesale price. In both contracts, the supplier shares part of the retailer’s risk in facing a 
stochastic demand. Although the theoretical benefits of coordinating contracts have been 
widely studied, it is also known that retailers fail to place the optimal order quantities in 
practice (Katok & Wu 2009). Almost all the works in this field have focused on finding 
how and why this deviation happens (Katok 2011).  
1.2 Purpose of the Thesis  
The purpose of this thesis is to explore possible ways through which the 
performance of a supply chain can be improved by influencing the retailer to choose 
order quantities close to the channel’s optimal order quantity. 
1.3 Method of Thesis  
The following steps are used throughout the thesis in order to analyze and 
improve the performance of the decision maker: 
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• All the experiments are designed using Microsoft Excel with Visual Basic. 
The experiments are conducted in a laboratory setting. 
• The final outcomes of the experiments are analyzed and compared with 
the optimal values. 
• Discussing the effects of different approaches on the decision maker. 
To improve the performance of the decision maker or the retailer, various 
approaches have been used. However, all the approaches used are variations of revenue 
sharing and buyback contracts. Initially two experiments, simple revenue sharing and 
simple buyback contracts, are conducted which yield results similar to Katok & Wu 
(2009). Although theory says that the coordinating contracts improve the performance of 
the decision makers, it is not the case in reality. These experiments display a popular 
phenomenon illustrated in Schweitzer & Cachon (2000), known as “pull to center”.  
In all the experiments conducted, the supplier, assumed to be rational, sets the 
parameters of the contract according to the theoretical optimal values. The retailer, 
however, is assumed to be prone to behavioral misjudgments and errors. Therefore, the 
order quantities chosen by the retailer can systematically deviate from the optimal values. 
This suboptimal decision has a negative impact on the profitability of the retailer, 
supplier and the channel. Hence, the supplier tries to design the contract terms or offer 
additional information to address the inefficiency in the retailer’s decision and in turn 
improving the performance. Three approaches are explored in this thesis, which could 
possibly improve the performance of a revenue sharing or buyback contract. The 
effectiveness of each approach is verified through laboratory experiments. One of these 
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approaches concern the contract terms, which the supplier offers the retailer. The other 
two approaches are concerned with providing the retailer with additional information or 
feedback that might help the retailer to make better decisions. In the first approach, a new 
type of contract, which is a combination of revenue sharing and buyback contracts, is 
considered. In the second, the impact of providing the retailer with visual information 
about the nature of demand uncertainty is observed. This could possibly discourage the 
retailer to follow shortsighted strategies such as demand chasing. In the last approach, a 
new performance measure, would-be total profit, is provided to the retailer. This new 
information is expected to discourage the retailer to follow a demand chasing strategy. 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
The next chapter revisits the studies in the supply chain contracts and behavioral 
studies. Chapter 3 explains the analytical models that are used in this thesis. Experimental 
design, protocol and implementation are discussed in Chapter 4, followed by hypotheses 
in Chapter 5. Detailed results are discussed in Chapter 6 and limitations and future 
research are discussed in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 concludes the paper with a summary of the 
results. 
5 
 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A newsvendor problem focuses on placing an order, which maximizes the total 
supply chain profit. Studies have shown that using coordinating contracts such as revenue 
sharing and buyback contracts can mitigate the newsvendor problem. Empirical studies 
have concentrated on newsvendor problem from different perspectives. Behavioral 
studies are one such area, which considers newsvendor problem as a challenge.  
In this research we study a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a supplier and 
a retailer, in which the retailer faces a classical newsvendor problem. Newsvendor 
problem has a lengthy history and is widely studied in operations management. See Qin 
et al (2011) for a recent review of the literature. The newsvendor problem not only has 
many applications in the business world, but it is also the building block for many other 
inventory problems. 
Although the elegant structure of the newsvendor problem has let the researchers 
develop analytical solutions for different variants of the problem, it has been known for a 
while that decision makers facing this problem deviate from the theoretical optimal 
solution in practice. For instance, see Fisher & Raman (1996) and Corbett & Fransoo 
(2007). These observations have attracted many researchers’ attention as to how and why 
this deviation happens. There are many works, which try to explore this behavior through 
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laboratory experiments. Schweitzer & Cachon (2000), in a set of laboratory experiments, 
observe that the subjects’ order quantity always fall between the average demand and the 
optimal value. That is, for a high profit margin product, for which the optimal order 
quantity is higher than the average demand, the subjects’ average order quantity is also 
higher than the average demand, but lower than the optimal value. 
For low profit margin products, for which the optimal order quantity is lower than 
the average demand, the subjects’ average order quantity is lower than the average 
demand, but higher than the optimal value. This behavior is known as “pull to center.” 
Schweitzer & Cachon (2000) attribute this behavior to ex-post inventory error and 
anchoring and insufficient adjustment. Through their experimental analysis, they rule out 
the influential impacts of other factors like risk aversion, loss aversion, prospect theory 
preferences, waste aversion, and stock-out aversion. Lamba & Sharma (2011) also show 
that risk aversion is not a possible explanation for suboptimal performance in a revenue 
sharing contract. Building on Schweitzer & Cachon’s (2000) model, Bostian et al (2008) 
use an adaptive learning algorithm to justify the pull to center behavior. Unlike 
Schweitzer & Cachon (2000), Bostian et al (2008) find that subjects’ average order 
quantity is very close to the mean demand at the first round of decisions. However, order 
quantities diverge from the mean demand in successive decision rounds. The authors’ 
adaptive learning model explains the pull to center behavior and show that subjects 
respond to recent gains and losses.  
Using a model based on quantal choice theory, Kremer et al (2010) show that 
decision makers’ random error cannot be the main source of deviation from the optimal 
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order quantity. They show that context dependent strategies such as anchoring, chasing, 
or inventory error minimizing play more influential roles in the decision making process. 
Bolton & Katok (2008) study the impact of experience and feedback on the 
subjects’ behavior. The authors show that subjects’ decisions improve over the 100 
rounds of decisions in their experiments. However, they report a very slow rate of 
improvement. They also show that restricting subjects’ decisions to 10 rounds of standing 
orders can improve the quality of decisions (they increased the number of order quantities 
to 1000 rounds in this experiment). Among other results, they show that limiting the 
number of options from 100 possible order quantities in each decision round to 9 or 3 
options cannot improve the quality of decisions. Their other results include examining the 
impacts of providing the subjects with extra information such as the payoff for the 
foregone options or providing payoff statistics for different decision options at the 
beginning of the experiment. They show that none of these information and feedbacks 
can improve the outcome. 
Lurie & Swaminathan (2009) also use laboratory experiments to study the impact 
of feedback frequency on the quality of decisions in a newsvendor problem. More 
specifically, they examine the performance of a newsvendor when an order quantity 
decision is standing for a set of rounds and the profit feedback is provided at the end of 
each set of rounds. They show that the newsvendor’s profit can increase with a decrease 
in feedback frequency. They also find that introducing costs to making changes in 
successive decisions does not improve the newsvendor performance when the feedback 
frequency is high. The authors show when the feedback frequency is high, decision 
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makers tend to limit their information access to the most recent set of presented data, 
hence, they are more prone to overreacting to noisy feedback. They also show feedback 
frequency plays a more influential role than decision frequency. 
Different types of supply chain contracts have been studied under different 
experimental settings. Keser & Paleologo (2004) and Luch & Wu (2008) study wholesale 
price contracts. Coordinating contracts are studied by Ho & Zhang (2008), Katok & Wu 
(2009), and Davis (2010). Two-part tariffs and quantity discount contracts are studies by 
Ho & Zhang (2009). Katok & Wu (2009) study buyback and revenue sharing contracts. 
Davis (2010) investigates pull contracts (both wholesale price and coordinating). The 
common result in all these papers is that these contracts fail to coordinate the supply 
chain in experimental setups. A review of this stream of research can be found in Katok 
(2011). 
Katok & Wu (2009) separate the interaction of supplier and retailers by letting 
subjects play the role of retailers against computerized (fully rational) suppliers, or the 
role of suppliers against computerized retailers. In this way they can avoid the fairness 
effect, which appears when human retailers interact with human suppliers. They find that 
the way demand distribution is presented (framed) to subjects’ affects their decision 
quality. They also show that in a high demand situation, the retailer performs better under 
a buyback contract than under a revenue sharing contract. The difference, however, 
decreases and disappears with experience.  
Similar to the present research, Becker-Peth et al (2011) try to improve the 
performance of a newsvendor buyer in a coordinating contract. The authors consider a 
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buyback contract and show that a newsvendor retailer responds differently to different 
contract parameters even if these parameters result in the same critical ratio. They build a 
behavioral model, which depends on buyer’s anchoring to mean demand, loss aversion, 
and different valuation of income. The authors first estimate the parameters of the model 
through subjects’ responses to a wide range of contract parameters and then find a 
contract, which could result in the channel optimal solution. They also show that the 
contract can be customized for each subject. The model, however, cannot control the 
share of supplier’s profit from the channel’s profit. 
Through a series of experiments, Shampanier et al (2007) show that people 
usually perceive the benefits associated with free products to be higher than what 
classical economics predicts. They attribute this behavior to the difficulty people have in 
mapping their utility. So, they are more inclined toward a free product since it is an 
option with no downside. Lamba & Sharma (2011) show that offering free items increase 
the order quantity; thereby improving the performance of the decision maker in a revenue 
sharing contract. They also observe that the adjusted revenue sharing contract helps in 
reducing the variations seen in the order quantities of the subjects. Through this research, 
it can be noted that the decision makers are influenced by the incentives offered. This 
forms the base for the combined contract approach in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DESCRIPTIVE MODELS 
This section introduces the analytical details of the newsvendor problem, the 
revenue sharing contract, the buyback contract and the combined contract. The concept of 
showing demand pattern and providing collective feedback are also discussed in this 
section.  
3.1 The Newsvendor Problem 
In a typical newsvendor problem, the decision maker faces an uncertain demand, 
x for any product to be sold. The decision maker has to place an order quantity, Q before 
the beginning of the shopping season. Each unit is purchased at cost ‘c’ and sells at price 
‘p’, where p>c. For the purview of this paper we assume that: 
• The salvage value of any item unsold is zero. 
• The demand is uniformly distributed as D~U(a,b) 
• Any unsold items cannot be carried over to the next season. 
• The supplier sets the wholesale price and all the contract parameters. 
 
Based on the above assumptions, if the order quantity (Q) is greater than the 
demand (x), then there are unsold items, incurring the loss of ‘c’ per item. If the
11 
 
order quantity (Q) is less than the demand (x), then there is a lost opportunity to sell the 
item, incurring the loss of ‘p-c’.  
Assume probability density function as f(x) and the cumulative function as F(x), 
then the optimal order quantity Q* can be written as, 
𝐹(𝑄∗) =  �𝑝 − 𝑐
𝑝
� 
For a uniform distribution D~U (a,b),  
𝑄∗ = 𝑎 + (𝑏 − 𝑎) �𝑝−𝑐
𝑝
�                                                         (1) 
The ratio �𝑝−𝑐
𝑝
� is termed as critical fractile. The critical fractile is the ratio of underage 
costs to overage costs. 
(For proof see Appendix A) 
Now consider a two-echelon supply chain with a supplier providing the inventory 
to the retailer, who sells the products to the final customer. In this case, the retailer is the 
decision maker and faces the newsvendor problem. Each unit will be sold to retailer at 
wholesale price ‘w’ and retailer sells the product to the final customer at the price ‘p’. 
The supplier incurs the cost ‘c’ for manufacturing each product. The expected profit of 
the retailer in this setup is: 
                               𝐸(𝜋𝑟) =  𝑝 𝐸�𝑆(𝑄)� −  𝑤𝑄                                                     (2)                                                                                                      
where E(S(Q)) is the expected sales when the retailer places and order quantity, Q.
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Similarly, the suppliers expected profit is: 
𝐸(𝜋𝑠) = (𝑤 − 𝑐)𝑄                                                            (3) 
The value of expected sales E(S(Q)) is expressed as: 
𝐸�𝑆(𝑄)� =  1(𝑏 − 𝑎)�2𝑏𝑄 − (𝑄2 + 𝑎2)2 � 
The sections 3.2 and 3.3 discuss two popular contracts used in day-to-day 
business. Section 3.3 discusses about the contract formed by combining revenue sharing 
and buyback contracts. 
3.2 Revenue Sharing Contract 
In order to coordinate the supply chain, many contracts are used frequently. One 
such coordinating contract is the revenue sharing contract. With this contract, the supplier 
incentivizes the retailer by offering a very low wholesale price ‘wrs’, where wrs< c. In 
return, the retailer shares part of the revenue, ‘r’, for every item sold. Let the retailer’s 
share of the supply chain profit be λ and (1-λ) be the supplier’s share of the supply chain 
profit, where 𝜆 ∈ [0,1].  
Based on the contract parameters, the optimal order quantity for revenue sharing 
contracts can be expressed as: 
𝑄𝑟𝑠
∗ = 𝑎 + (𝑏 − 𝑎) �𝑝−𝑤𝑟𝑠∗ −𝑟𝑟𝑠∗
𝑝−𝑟𝑟𝑠
∗ �                                                 (4) 
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The values for selling price and the shared revenue can be determined by: 
𝑤𝑟𝑠
∗ =  𝜆𝑐                                                                                (5) 
𝑟𝑟𝑠
∗ = (1 − 𝜆)𝑝                                                                           (6) 
The expected profit of the retailer, 𝐸(𝜋𝑟𝑠𝑟 ) = ( 𝑝 − 𝑟) 𝐸�𝑆(𝑄)� −  𝑤𝑄  
When the retailer places the optimal order quantity, 𝑄𝑟𝑠∗ , the the above equation can be 
rewritten as: 
𝐸(𝜋𝑟𝑠∗𝑟) = ( 𝑝 − 𝑟𝑟𝑠∗ ) 𝐸�𝑆(𝑄𝑟𝑠∗ )� −  𝑤𝑟𝑠∗ 𝑄𝑟𝑠∗                                              (7) 
The expected profit of the supplier, 𝐸(𝜋𝑟𝑠𝑠 ) = (𝑤 − 𝑐)𝑄 + 𝑟𝐸(𝑆(𝑄)) 
When the retailer places the optimal order quantity, 𝑄𝑟𝑠∗  , the above equation can be 
rewritten as: 
𝐸(𝜋𝑟𝑠∗𝑠) = (𝑤𝑟𝑠∗ − 𝑐)𝑄𝑟𝑠∗ + 𝑟𝑟𝑠∗ 𝐸�𝑆(𝑄𝑟𝑠∗ )�                                                  (8) 
3.3 Buyback Contract  
Another coordinating contract used in many businesses is buyback contract. In a 
buyback contract, the retailer pays a higher wholesale price ‘wbb’ when compared to 
revenue sharing contract. However, the supplier buys back all the unsold items at price 
‘b’ at the end of the selling season.  
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Based on the contract parameters, the optimal order quantity for buyback contracts can be 
expressed as: 
𝑄𝑏𝑏
∗ = 𝑎 + (𝑏 − 𝑎) �𝑝−𝑤𝑏𝑏∗
𝑝−𝑏𝑏𝑏
∗ �                                                                 (9) 
The values for selling price and the buyback price can be determined by: 
𝑤𝑏𝑏
∗ =  𝑏 + 𝜆𝑐                                                                                (10) 
𝑏𝑏𝑏
∗ = (1 − 𝜆)𝑝                                                                               (11) 
The expected profit of the retailer, 𝐸(𝜋𝑏𝑏𝑟 ) =  𝑝𝐸(𝑆(𝑄)) − 𝑤𝑄 + 𝑏(𝑄 − 𝐸�𝑆(𝑄)�                                            
The expected profit of the supplier, 𝐸(𝜋𝑏𝑏𝑠 ) = (𝑤 − 𝑐)𝑄 − 𝑏(𝑄 − 𝐸(𝑆(𝑄)) 
When the retailer places the optimal order quantity, 𝑄𝑟𝑠∗  , the above equations can be 
rewritten as: 
𝐸(𝜋𝑏𝑏∗𝑟 ) =  𝑝𝐸(𝑆(𝑄𝑏𝑏∗ )) − 𝑤𝑏𝑏∗ 𝑄𝑏𝑏∗ + 𝑏𝑏𝑏∗ (𝑄𝑏𝑏∗ − 𝐸�𝑆(𝑄𝑏𝑏∗ )�                                 (12) 
𝐸(𝜋𝑏𝑏∗𝑠 ) = (𝑤𝑏𝑏∗ − 𝑐)𝑄𝑏𝑏∗ − 𝑏𝑏𝑏∗ (𝑄𝑏𝑏∗ − 𝐸(𝑆(𝑄𝑏𝑏∗ ))                                                 (13) 
3.4 Combined Contract  
Although revenue sharing and buyback contracts can improve the performance of 
the supply chain, improvement is not as much as the theory predicts. The idea behind this 
approach comes from the observation that each of these two contracts can individually 
improve the performance of the supply chain to some extent. So, would there be a further 
improvement in the performance of the decision maker with a combination of these two 
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contracts? A combined revenue sharing and buyback contract is a contract where the 
supplier offers a relatively low wholesale price ‘𝑤𝑐𝑜𝑚’ and in return the retailer shares a 
part of the revenue ‘𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑚’ for each item sold. In addition, the supplier buys back the 
unsold items at a price ‘𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑚’ lower than the wholesale price.  
Cachon & Lariviere (2005) show buyback and revenue sharing contracts are 
theoretically equivalent. That is, they result in the same profits for the retailer and the 
supplier for any realization of the random demand. Although the literature reports the 
theoretical equivalence of the two contracts, they are always treated as two distinct 
contracts. We also observe that these two contracts are the two ends of a spectrum of 
combined contracts as we defined above.  
The optimal order quantity, which maximizes the retailer’s profit, can be 
expressed as: 
  Qcom∗ = a + (b − a) �p−wcom∗ −rcom∗p−bcom∗ −rcom∗ �                                                      (14) 
For any chosen wholesale price, wcom ∈ [λc, λc + (1 − λ)p] , the following set of shared 
revenue and buyback prices can coordinate the supply chain and result in an order 
quantity equal to the optimal channel order quantity. 
    rcom∗ = (1 − λ)p + λc − wcom∗                                                   (15) 
bcom∗ =  wcom ∗ − λc                                                                       (16)  
The combined contract turns into a pure revenue sharing contract if we choose the lowest 
range of wholesale price wcom = λc. Similarly, the combined contract turns into a pure
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buyback contract, if we choose the highest range of wholesale price wcom = λc +(1 − λ)p. 
3.5 Demand Pattern 
One of the reasons behind subjects’ suboptimal decisions is argued to be subjects’ 
focus on the most recent demand which could in turn lead to a demand chasing pattern 
(Schweitzer & Cachon 2000, Bostian et al, 2008, and Lurie & Swaminathan, 2009). 
Subjects’ focus on the most recent demands could be due to their inability to comprehend 
the true nature of demand uncertainty. In all experiments conducted for this thesis, we 
informed the subjects that the demand was uniformly distributed between 100 and 300. 
However, they did not have any visual explanation as to how the demand might have 
occurred. This is the case in almost all other similar research works. In this experiment, 
an additional graph that has a sample demand history for 50 shopping seasons is shown to 
the subjects. With this experiment, an effort is made to improve the performance of the 
decision maker in a revenue sharing contract set up.  
 
Figure 1: Visualization of demand pattern (uniform distribution) 
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3.6 Collective Feedback  
Both Bolton & Katok (2008) and Lurie & Swaminathan (2009) show that the 
performance of a newsvendor can be improved by restricting a decision to stand for a set 
of rounds. That is, when the retailer makes a decision in a shopping season (round), then 
the same decision will be applied for a set of successive shopping seasons. The result of 
this decision (feedback) is revealed to the retailer only after the demand is realized for all 
these shopping seasons. Standing order reduces the frequency of decision making 
opportunities. Therefore, the subjects know that each order quantity decision impacts 
more than one round. This could encourage them to look at the demand randomness in a 
more collective way, which in turn might reduce their tendency for demand chasing. On 
the other hand, standing orders reduces the feedback frequency too. Hence, each 
feedback contains the collective impacts of an order quantity on the profit of more than 
one realized demands. This collective measure, in a sense, reduces the randomness in 
demand and shows a more accurate value of each order quantity. The experiments by 
Lurie & Swaminathan (2009) suggest that the improvement in a standing order setup is 
mainly due to a reduction in feedback frequency (not a reduction in order frequency). 
Although standing orders can result in average order quantities, which are closer 
to the optimal value, it has the practical limitation of preventing the retailer to place an 
order for each shopping period. Such orders will have the limitation of preventing the 
retailer to access the result of a decision at the end of each period. As a result, applying 
standing order might not be practical in many business situations. In order to address this 
restriction, the concept of would-be total profit is introduced. 
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In this approach, once a subject chooses an order quantity, a total profit, which 
would be earned if the chosen order quantity were chosen for all previous rounds, is 
presented. For example, if a subject chooses an order quantity of 230 in the 20th round, 
then the would-be total profit will show the total profit if 230 were the chosen order 
quantity for all the first 20 rounds. Hence, the would-be total profit provides a feedback 
in every round, which is identical to the feedback provided in a regular standing order. In 
the new approach, however, the retailer does not face the limitations of a standing order. 
That is, in the new approach the retailer can make a decision for every round and access 
the feedback at the end of each round. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EXPERIMENTS 
4.1 Experimental Design 
We use laboratory experiments to investigate the effectiveness of the different 
approaches that we propose in order to prove the performance of revenue sharing and 
buyback contracts. In all these experiments, we assume that the supplier’s production cost 
is c=4, the retailer’s selling price is p=20, and the demand is uniformly distributed 
between 100 and 300 ( 𝐷~𝑈(100,300)).  
Since the benefit of coordination is larger for high profit margin products 
((𝑝 − 𝑐) / 𝑝 > 0.5), we focus only on this category of products. Moreover, for a low 
profit margin product, subjects’ more than optimal order quantities can in fact increase 
the supplier’s profit. So, there is no incentive for the supplier to try to lower the order 
quantities to the supply chain optimal level. There are seven different experimental 
treatments – simple revenue sharing, simple buyback, two combined contract 
experiments, revenue sharing with demand pattern, revenue sharing with collective 
feedback and buyback with collective feedback.  
In our experiments, the subjects respond to the contracts offered by a supplier. We 
assume the supplier is rational and risk-neutral. As a result, the supplier’s decisions are  
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always consistent with the theoretical optimal solutions. For the revenue sharing and 
buyback contracts we always set the contract parameters such that the retailer’s 
theoretical share of total profit is 𝜆=1/ 4. 
All the experiments are designed using Microsoft Excel combined with macros, 
which are added using Visual Basic. The excel sheet shows the selling price w, revenue-
sharing price r, for all RS experiments. The revenue-sharing price is replaced by buyback 
price b, in BB experiments. Once the subject chose the order quantity for a shopping 
period (round), the demand is realized (a draw from a uniformly distributed random 
variable). Then, this demand along with the profit for the shopping period, the 
accumulated profit so far, the cost of overstocking, and the cost of under-stocking for that 
round were shown to the subject. Two graphs on the screen showed the history of 
decisions made (order quantities) accompanied by the realized demand and the history of 
profits in earlier rounds. A screenshot of the user interface can be found in Appendix B.  
4.2 Experimental Protocol 
All the subjects were College of Management students at the University of 
Massachusetts, Boston. We conducted the experiments in different management classes. 
The instructors of selected course permitted us to run the experiments in their classes as a 
required class activity. We conducted the experiments in a mix of graduate and 
undergraduate classes in four semesters during academic years of 2010-11 and 2011-12. 
To make sure that the results from undergraduate and graduate classes are comparable, 
we conducted the experiment on simple revenue sharing contract in a graduate and in an 
undergraduate class. The results were statistically equivalent to Katok& Wu (2009) with 
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the equivalence of the responses from undergraduate and graduate students in their 
experiments. 
At the beginning of each experiment session, the supply chain setup is explained 
to subjects using PowerPoint presentation. The presentation, which usually took around 
20 minutes, included simple numerical examples and how the subjects can interact with 
the software. A summary of the numerical values of the experiment parameters was 
visible on top of the screen at all times during the experiment.  
To incentivize students we presented the experiment as a contest through which 
the students could find out how good they were at making decisions under uncertain 
environment (demand). Moreover, cash prizes to the top three students with the best total 
performance ($40, $30, and $20) were offered. Subjects played the role of retailer’s 
purchasing manager who decides about the order quantities for different shopping periods 
(rounds). Therefore, each subject’s performance was measured by the retailer’s total 
profit after 50 rounds of decision-making. 
4.3 Implementation 
In all the experiments, λ is considered to be retailer’s share of the supply chain 
profit and the supplier’s share is considered as (1-λ).  We set λ=1/4 in all the experiments 
(see Appendix A).  
For all revenue sharing treatments, the optimal value of shared revenue, r* =15, is 
calculated using Equation (6) and the selling price, w*=1, is calculated using Equation 
(5). Based on these parameters, the profit-maximizing order-quantity for revenue sharing
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experiments is Q* =260. 
For all buyback treatments, the optimal value of buyback price, b* =15, is 
calculated using Equation (11) and the selling price, w*=16, is calculated using Equation 
(10). Based on these parameters, the profit-maximizing order-quantity for buyback 
experiments is Q* =260. 
We conducted two combined contract experiments where the incentives from two 
contracts, revenue sharing and buyback contract, were combined. Here the revenue 
sharing and buyback contracts were considered as two ends of the spectrum. One 
combined contract had wcom1=4.75, which was closer to revenue sharing end and another 
combined contract has wcom2=12.25, which was closer to buyback end of the spectrum. 
The values of shared revenue, rcom1=11.25 and rcom2 = 3.75, and buyback price, 
bcom1=3.75 and bcom2=11.25, were calculated using the Equations (15) and (16) 
respectively.
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CHAPTER 5 
HYPOTHESIS 
In all the experimental setups, the subjects played the role of a retailer or decision 
maker. These decision makers chose the order quantities, one season at a time, and profits 
are generated based on these decisions.  
We first conducted two experiments on simple revenue sharing and simple 
buyback contracts. Theory shows that these contracts coordinate the supply chain by 
incentivizing the retailer to place the profit maximizing order quantity.  Hypothesis 1 
verifies whether these contracts will help in coordinating the supply chain as seen in 
theory.   
Hypothesis 1: The average order quantity placed by the retailer in simple revenue sharing 
and simple buyback contracts will be 260. 
We conducted the next two experiments on combined contract. The idea behind 
this approach is that a contract which has the appealing features of both revenue sharing 
and buyback contracts might inspire more confidence in subjects and encourage them to 
place higher order quantities. Another theory behind these experiments is that revenue 
sharing and buyback contracts are two ends of the spectrum. The two combined contracts 
are formed by altering values of selling price w, shared revenue r and buyback price b. 
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It is made sure that these sets of values can coordinate the supply chain. Hypothesis 2 is 
used to verify the theoretical results that predict the same order quantities for the family 
of combined contracts with the same value of λ. 
Hypothesis 2: All contracts in a family of combined contracts with the same value of 𝜆 
result in the same average order quantity.  
The idea behind our next approach is to provide visual information about the 
demand pattern to help the subjects to better understand the random nature of the demand 
and discourage them to chase the demand. Hypothesis 3 is stated to investigate the impact 
of providing visual information about the demand pattern. 
Hypothesis 3: The average order quantity of a revenue sharing contract with additional 
(visual) information about the demand pattern will be 260. 
In order to avoid the standing orders, where each decision impacts more than one 
round, a concept of would-be total profit is introduced in our next two experiments. The 
value of this would-be total profit is negligible in the starting rounds of the experiment. 
However, as the number of rounds increases, the value of information provided by this 
number also increases. In other words, in the higher rounds, this would-be total profit 
(and its comparison with the actual total profit) is a good measure for the real value of the 
selected order quantity. Since the buyer usually focuses on the feedbacks of the latest 
round, this piece of information should be under retailer’s attention range. As a result, we 
can expect a learning pattern in retailer’s decision process and observe better decisions 
toward the final rounds. 
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We try to verify this conjecture through the following two hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 4A: The average order quantity of a revenue sharing contract, with would-be 
total profit feedback, will be 260. 
Hypothesis 4B: The average order quantity of a buyback contract, with would-be total 
profit feedback, will be 260. 
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CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS 
As discussed earlier, the subjects played the role of decision maker or the retailer 
in all the experiments. A total of seven experiments were conducted with a total of 126 
subjects. The final outcome of these experiments was the order quantity, which affected 
the overall profit of the retailer. The results from these experiments were tested using 
Wilcoxon rank sum test (Berenson, Krehbiel, Levine & Stephan 2008), where the 
medians are used to test for the difference. T-test was avoided since the sample size in 
each experiment was lesser than 30 and normality could not be assumed. The value of 
“p” is calculated using the two-tailed tests with 95% confidence interval (𝛼 = 0.05 
significance level).  
Hypothesis 1: The first two experiments conducted verify the existing results in the 
literature. This hypothesis tests the average order quantity of the retailer in revenue 
sharing and buyback contracts. 
Contract Sample
Size 
w r b Optimal 
Order 
Quantity(Q*) 
Average 
Order 
Quantity 
(Q) 
Simple Revenue 
Sharing 
14 $1.00 $15.00 -- 260 228.9 
Simple Buyback 20 $16.00 -- $15.00 260 225 
Table 1: Parameters and results of simple revenue sharing and simple buyback contracts 
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The average order quantities in both revenue sharing (228.9) and buyback 
contract (225) are less than the optimal order quantity (260). The two-tail tests show that 
p value is 0.001 <0.05 (for revenue sharing contract) and 0.0001 <0.05 (for buyback 
contract). Hence we reject the hypothesis 1, which states that the average order quantities 
of revenue sharing and buyback contracts will be 260. The Figure 10 in Appendix B 
shows the “pull to center” phenomenon, where the subjects gradually adjust the order 
quantities around the mean demand (200).  
Hypothesis 2: The next two experiments conducted are the two variations of combined 
contracts. In order to test this hypothesis, four contracts in the family of combined 
contracts are compared. 
Contract Sample 
Size 
w r b Optimal 
Order 
Quantity(Q*) 
Average 
Order 
Quantity 
(Q) 
Simple Revenue 
Sharing 
14 $1.00 $15.00 -- 260 228.9 
Combined 1 18 $4.75 $11.25 $3.75 260 227.5 
Combined 2 18 $12.25 $3.75 $11.25 260 226.1 
Simple Buyback 20 $16.00 -- $15.00 260 225 
Table 2: Parameters and results of the combined contracts 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the revenue sharing and buyback contracts are 
considered to be the two ends of the spectrum. The new contracts, combined 1 and 
combined 2, are formed by altering the w, r and b values. As seen in the Table 2, revenue 
sharing contract is the beginning of the spectrum. As the buyback and wholesale price 
increases, we reach the other end of the spectrum where the combined contract turns into 
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pure buyback. This hypothesis is tested in 2 steps. In the first step the average order 
quantities of the simple revenue sharing and combined 1 are compared, where the p value 
is 0.12>0.05. In the second step, the average order quantities of the simple buyback and 
combined 2 are compared, where the p value is 0.12>0.05. This shows that we do not 
have enough evidence to reject the hypothesis 4, which states that the average order 
quantities will be same in a family of combined contracts.  
Katok & Wu (2009) observe differences between the average order quantities in 
simple buyback and simple revenue sharing contracts. They observe that depending on 
the demand range and the way the contract is framed, the buyback contracts can result in 
higher or lower average order quantities. They attribute this observation to loss aversion 
behavior of subjects. They also show that the difference between the average order 
quantities of the two contracts decreases and disappears with experience. This means that 
in general the subjects do not react to different forms of combined contracts. One 
explanation could be the possibility that the subjects do not respond to detailed contract 
terms but they react mainly to the resulting overage and underage costs, which are same 
in all these contracts. Hence, using combined contract is not an effective approach to 
influence the retailers to place optimal order quantities.  
Hypothesis 3: The results show that the average order quantity of a revenue sharing 
contract with the demand pattern (228.3) is almost the same as the average order quantity 
in simple revenue sharing contract (228.9). The p value is 0.0006 <0.005, which means 
that the hypothesis can be rejected. This implies that creating better understanding about 
the demand behavior through visualization cannot improve the quality of retailer’s 
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decisions. The subjects still concentrate on the latest demand realized and the inventory 
error. One possible explanation could be the possibility that being exposed to the demand 
pattern is not enough to create a better comprehension of the collective behavior of the 
demand.  
Hypothesis 4A: In order to make sure that subject’s clearly understood the concept of 
would-be total profit, they were asked to write a sentence or two about the concept.  
Contract Sample 
Size 
w r b Optimal 
Order 
Quantity(Q*) 
Average 
Order 
Quantity 
(Q) 
(last 10 
rounds) 
Simple revenue 
sharing 
14 $1.00 $15.00 -- 260 214.8 
Revenue sharing 
with would-be 
total profit 
18 $1.00 $15.00 -- 260 239.1 
Simple buyback 20 $16.00 -- $15.00 260 221.1 
Buyback with 
would-be total 
profit 
15 $16.00 -- $15.00 260 225.3 
Table 3: Parameters and results of simple contracts and contracts with would-be total 
profit feedback 
 
Before examining the hypothesis, linear regression is used to verify if there is an 
increasing trend in the subjects average order quantities. Since the sample size in each 
experiment is small, the regression assumptions have to be verified before performing the 
regression. The data sets are checked for normality, linearity and homoscedasticity. The 
data used in the experiments do not show any deviation from the assumptions. 
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The linear regression equation is expressed as: 
𝑦 = 0.58𝑥 + 217.47 
The results in the revenue sharing contract with feedback show a significant 
increasing trend (0.58 units per round, p<0.001). Figure 2 shows the average order 
quantities across the 50 round of our experiment. Such an increasing trend does not exist 
in the simple revenue sharing experiment. This lack of considerable learning trend in 
simple contracts is consistent with the prior research works. Schweitzer & Cachon (2000) 
did not observe a learning trend in their newsvendor experiment with 15 rounds of 
decisions. Bolton & Katok (2008) observe a learning trend in the newsvendors’ decisions 
in their extended experiment with 100 rounds of decisions. However, they reported a very 
low rate of increase in the average order quantities (0.13 units per round). 
 
 
Figure 2: Average order quantities with would-be total profit feedback (revenue sharing) 
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Considering the learning trend in the revenue sharing experiment with the would-
be total profit feedback, the last 10 rounds of the experiment are used to verify hypothesis 
4A and also to observe the impact of the learning process. The parameters and results of 
the experiments are presented in Table 3. Results show that the average order quantity 
(last 10 rounds) of the experiment with the would-be total profit feedback (239.1) has 
increased significantly (p= 0.01<0.05) compared to the corresponding value for a simple 
revenue sharing experiment (214.8). Although average of the last 10 rounds is still short 
of the optimal value (260), the difference is not statistically significant (p=0.7>0.05). 
Hence, there is not enough evidence to reject hypothesis 4A. This learning trend suggests 
that, in a revenue sharing contract, the retailer could eventually choose order quantities 
very close to the optimal value when he is provided with this type of feedback.  
Hypothesis 4B: The linear regression equation is expressed as: 
𝑦 = 0.18𝑥 + 221.9 
The results in the buyback contract with feedback do not show any significant 
increasing trend (0.18 units per round, p>0.05). Figure 3 shows the average order 
quantities across the 50 round of the buyback experiment. The regression analysis shows 
no significant slope in the average order quantities placed by the subjects through the 50 
rounds of the experiment. The comparison of the last 10 rounds of this experiment with 
the corresponding value for a simple buyback contract does not show any improvement 
either (225.3). Therefore, we can strongly reject hypothesis 4B (p=0.016<0.05). 
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Figure 3: Average order quantities with would-be total profit feedback (buyback) 
Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) use the order quantity adjustments to observe the 
demand chasing heuristic. The adjustment scores are defined by: 
(𝑞𝑡 − 𝑞𝑡−1)(𝑑𝑡−1 − 𝑞𝑡−1) 
 where 𝑞𝑡 and 𝑑𝑡 are order quantity and realized demand, respectively, in round t.  
 
Contract No Change Toward Away 
Simple Revenue 
Sharing 
50% 42.85% 7.14% 
Revenue Sharing 
With would-be 
Total Profit 
55.55% 22.22% 22.22% 
Simple Buyback 55% 35% 10% 
Buyback With 
would-be Total 
Profit 
73.33% 26.66% 0% 
Table 4: Percentage of order quantity adjustments (for last 10 rounds)
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Table 4 shows the results of the order quantity adjustments. The demand chasing 
in revenue sharing with would-be total profit (22.22%) is significantly low when 
compared to the simple revenue sharing contract (42.85%) with p value 0.009<0.05. The 
subjects tend to move away from the prior demand in this case. A possible explanation 
could be the positive learning seen in revenue sharing with would-be total profit contact. 
Even though there is no significant difference (p= 0.06>0.05) between the demand 
chasing in buyback with would-be total profit (26.66%) and simple buyback contract 
(42.85%), the subjects tend to stabilize the order quantities towards the last rounds 
(73.33%). These results show that the would-be total profit feedback can be used to 
reduce demand chasing characteristic in subjects.   
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CHAPTER 7 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Considering the constraints under which this thesis has been undertaken, there are 
myriad possible future directions for research in this area. The first limitation is the 
subject pool that was used for experiments. Graduate and under graduate students who 
were pursuing operations management at University of Massachusetts Boston were 
chosen as subjects for the experiments. There were some subjects who had prior 
experience of similar experiments. Although effort was made to separate such subjects, 
complete success cannot be guaranteed. Another question that might open up area for 
new research is to determine the differences of the experience levels between Graduate 
and Undergraduate students. Another limitation that might have affected the results is the 
number of rounds used in the experiments. As mention in Chapter 6, the revenue sharing 
contract with would-be total profit as the feedback mechanism has shown positive 
learning towards the end. An interesting research question would be: Will this learning 
pattern continue and lead the decision makers chose the optimal order quantities? This 
needs further research to see if increasing rounds can improve the performance.  
Further, exploring the possible approaches that can improve other contracts, such 
as quantity discount, in practice could be a possible avenue for future research. 
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CHAPTER 8 
SUMMARY AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
Revenue sharing and buyback contracts are two types of coordinating contracts 
and yield maximum profit in the supply chain. However, even with these contracts the 
decision makers fail to choose optimal order quantities. This thesis considers a two-
echelon supply chain, where a rational supplier offers optimal contract parameters to a 
retailer who is prone to behavioral errors and misjudgments. The retailer fails to place an 
order with optimal quantity, which in turn results in less than optimal profits for all 
parties in the supply chain.  
In order to improve the performance of the retailer, this paper suggests three 
approaches. The first approach is the combined contract. This contract includes the 
advantage of low wholesale price as well as supplier buying the unsold items at the end 
of shopping season. Even though this approach does not influence the retailer to order 
optimal order quantities, a spectrum of combined contracts is introduced. This paper 
proves that revenue sharing and buyback are two ends of a spectrum and based on the 
wholesale price chosen, a set of combined contracts can be formed.  
In the second approach the demand pattern is shown in form of a graph in order to 
ensure that the retailers understand the random behavior of demand. Even with this 
information, the results show that the performance of the retailers does not improve.  
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The third approach shows that the would-be total profit can create positive 
learning in a revenue sharing contract. The decision makers learn from their prior 
decisions and eventually place order quantities close to optimal values. The revenue 
sharing contract with the feedback also reduces the demand chasing characteristic in 
decision makers. Even though the buyback contracts with feedback do not show any 
positive learning, results show that the retailers tend to stabilize the order quantities 
towards the last rounds of the experiment.  
The results observed in this thesis have significant managerial implications. The 
collective feedback (would-be total profit) can be used as a decision support tool, which 
can increase the effectiveness of a revenue sharing contract.  
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APPENDIX A 
A.1 Newsvendor Problem 
Consider, ‘x’ as a random demand variable. Let the probability density function be 𝑓(𝑥) 
and cumulative demand distribution be 𝐹(𝑥). 
𝐹(𝑥) = ∫ 𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥𝑄0  and ∫ 𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 = 1∞0  
Consider ‘Q’ to be the order quantity. Let 𝐶𝑜be the cost of unsold items (overage costs) 
and 𝐶𝑢 be the cost lost opportunity (underage costs). Then, the newsvendor problem can 
be expressed as: 
𝑖𝑓 𝑥 < 𝑄 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝐶𝑜 = 𝑄 − 𝑥  
𝑖𝑓 𝑥 > 𝑄 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝐶𝑢 = 𝑝 − 𝑐 
Then the expected profit of the newsvendor is: 
𝐸�𝜋(𝑄)� =  � (𝑝𝑥 − 𝑐𝑄)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + � ((𝑝 − 𝑐)𝑄)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥∞
𝑄
𝑄
0
 
To get the optimal order quantity𝑄∗,  
𝑑 �𝐸�𝜋(𝑄)��
𝑑𝑄
=  � −𝑐𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + � (𝑝 − 𝑐)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥∞
𝑄
+ � (𝑝 − 𝑐)𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥𝑄
0
𝑄
0
= 0 
−𝑐𝐹(𝑄∗) + (𝑝 − 𝑐) − (𝑝 − 𝑐)𝐹(𝑄∗) = 0 
𝐹(𝑄∗) =  �𝑝 − 𝑐
𝑝
� 
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𝑄∗ = 𝐹−1 �𝑝 − 𝑐
𝑝
� 
With the uniform distribution D~U (a,b), the cumulative demand distribution can be 
expressed as: 
𝐹(𝑥) = � 0,    𝑥 < 𝑎𝑥 − 𝑎
𝑏 − 𝑎
, 𝑎 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑏1,     𝑥 ≥ 𝑏   
𝐹(𝑄∗) = �𝑝 − 𝑐
𝑝
� = �𝑄∗ − 𝑎
𝑏 − 𝑎
� 
𝑄∗ = 𝑎 + (𝑏 − 𝑎) �𝑝 − 𝑐
𝑝
� 
The expected sales is expressed as, 
𝐸�𝑆(𝑄)� = � 𝑥𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + � 𝑄𝑓(𝑥)𝑑𝑥𝑏
𝑄
𝑄
𝑎
 
=  1
𝑏 − 𝑎
��
𝑥22 �
𝑎
𝑄 + [𝑄𝑥]𝑄𝑏�   
= 1
𝑏 − 𝑎
 �2𝑏𝑄 − (𝑄2 + 𝑎2)2 � 
A.2 Optimal contract parameters in revenue sharing contract 
Let ‘w’ and ‘r’ be the selling price and shared revenue price respectively. Let ‘λ’ be the 
retailer’s share of the supply chain profit and ‘(1-λ)’ be supplier’s share of supply chain 
profit, where  𝜆 ∈ [0,1]. 
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𝜆 = �1 − 𝑟
𝑝
� 
The factors for obtaining critical fractile ratio in revenue sharing contract can be 
expressed by: 
Overage cost, 𝐶𝑜 = (𝑤 − 𝑐) 
Underage cost, 𝐶𝑢 = (𝑝 − 𝑤 − 𝑟) 
With the optimal wholesale price ‘𝑤𝑟𝑠∗ ’ and the optimal shared revenue price ‘𝑟𝑟𝑠∗ ’ , the 
critical fractile with revenue sharing contract is; 
𝐹(𝑄∗) = �𝑝 − 𝑤𝑟𝑠∗ − 𝑟𝑟𝑠∗
𝑝 − 𝑟𝑟𝑠∗
� 
For revenue sharing to be a coordinating contract, then the critical fractile obtained in the 
newsvendor problem should be equal to the critical fractile obtained in revenue sharing 
contract. 
�
𝑝 − 𝑤𝑟𝑠
∗ − 𝑟𝑟𝑠
∗
𝑝 − 𝑟𝑟𝑠∗
� = �𝑝 − 𝑐
𝑝
� 
𝑤𝑟𝑠
∗ = 𝑐 �1 − 𝑟𝑟𝑠∗
𝑝
� 
Hence, the optimal values for selling price and the shared revenue are: 
𝑤𝑟𝑠
∗ =  𝜆𝑐 
𝑟𝑟𝑠
∗ = (1 − 𝜆)𝑝 
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A.3 Optimal contract parameters in buyback contract 
Let ‘w’ and ‘b’ be the selling price and buyback price respectively. Let ‘λ’ be the 
retailer’s share of the supply chain profit and ‘(1-λ)’ be supplier’s share of supply chain 
profit, where 𝜆 ∈ [0,1]. 
𝜆 = �1 − 𝑏
𝑝
� 
The factors for obtaining critical fractile ratio in buyback contract can be expressed by: 
Overage cost, 𝐶𝑜 = (𝑤 − 𝑏) 
Underage cost, 𝐶𝑢 = (𝑝 − 𝑤) 
With the optimal wholesale price ‘𝑤𝑏𝑏∗ ’ and the optimal buyback price ‘𝑏𝑏𝑏∗ ’, the critical 
fractile with buyback contract is; 
𝐹(𝑄∗) = �𝑝 − 𝑤𝑏𝑏∗
𝑝 − 𝑏𝑏𝑏
∗ � 
For buyback to be a coordinating contract, then the critical fractile obtained in the 
newsvendor problem should be equal to the critical fractile obtained in buyback contract. 
�
𝑝 − 𝑤𝑏𝑏
∗
𝑝 − 𝑏𝑏𝑏
∗ � = �𝑝 − 𝑐𝑝 � 
𝑤𝑏𝑏
∗ = 𝑏 + 𝑐 �1 − 𝑏𝑏𝑏∗
𝑝
� 
Hence, the optimal values for selling price and the buyback price are: 
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𝑤𝑏𝑏
∗ = 𝑏𝑏𝑏∗ + 𝜆𝑐 
𝑏𝑏𝑏
∗ = (1 − 𝜆)𝑝 
 
A.4 Optimal contract parameters in combined contract 
Let ‘w’, ‘r’ and ‘b’ be the selling price, shared revenue price and buyback price 
respectively. Let ‘λ’ be the retailer’s share of the supply chain profit and ‘(1-λ)’ be 
supplier’s share of supply chain profit, where 𝜆 ∈ [0,1]. 
The factors for obtaining critical fractile ratio in combined contract can be expressed by: 
Overage cost, 𝐶𝑜 = (𝑤 − 𝑏) 
Underage cost, 𝐶𝑢 = (𝑝 − 𝑤 − 𝑟) 
With the optimal wholesale price ‘𝑤𝑐𝑜𝑚∗ ’, optimal shared revenue ‘𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑚∗ ’and the optimal 
buyback price ‘𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑚∗ ’, the critical fractile with combined contract is: 
𝐹(𝑄∗) = �𝑝 − 𝑤𝑐𝑜𝑚∗ − 𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑚∗
𝑝 − 𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑚∗ − 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑚∗
� 
or 
𝐹(𝑄∗) = �𝑝−(𝑤𝑐𝑜𝑚∗ +𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑚∗ )
𝑝−(𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑚∗ +𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑚∗ )�                                                         (1a) 
Consider the critical fractile with buyback contract: 
�
𝑝 − 𝑤
𝑝 − 𝑏
� 
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Substitute the optimal values for ‘w’ and ‘b’ in the above equation: 
�
𝑝 − [(1 − 𝜆)𝑝 + 𝜆𝑐]
𝑝 − [(1 − 𝜆)𝑝] � 
Replace the above values in Equation (1a) 
𝑤𝑐𝑜𝑚
∗ + 𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑚∗ =  (1 − 𝜆)𝑝 + 𝜆𝑐 
∴ 𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑚
∗ =  (1 − 𝜆)𝑝 + 𝜆𝑐 − 𝑤𝑐𝑜𝑚∗  
and 
(𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑚∗ + 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑚∗ ) =  (1 − 𝜆)𝑝 
⟹ 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑚
∗ =  (1 − 𝜆)𝑝 − 𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑚∗  
∴ 𝑏𝑐𝑜𝑚
∗ =  𝑤𝑐𝑜𝑚∗ − 𝜆𝑐 
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APPENDIX B 
B.1. Experiment design 
 
Figure 4: Screenshot of revenue sharing contract experiment 
 
 
Figure 5: Screenshot of buyback contract experiment 
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Figure 6: Screenshot of combined contract experiment 
 
 
Figure 7: Screenshot of revenue sharing with demand pattern experiment 
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Figure 8: Screenshot of revenue sharing with would-be total profit feedback experiment 
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B.2. Average order quantities of subjects 
 
Figure 9: Average order quantities in a revenue sharing contract 
 
Figure 10: Average order quantities in a buyback contract
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Figure 11: Average order quantities in two combined contracts 
 
 
Figure 12: Average order quantities in revenue sharing with demand pattern 
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Figure 13: Average order quantities in a revenue sharing with would-be total profit 
feedback 
 
 
Figure 14: Average order quantities in a buyback with would-be total profit feedback 
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